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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS 
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT OF 1969-STRYCKER'S BAY NEIGHBORHOOD 
COUNCIL, INC. v. KARLEN 
Paula A. Kelly* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The scope of a court's review of an agency's decision-making proc-
ess is a matter of "crucial importance"! in the field of administrative 
law. Review may range from complete deference to the agency's 
decision to virtual substitution of the court's judgment for that of the 
agency.2 Selection of a standard somewhere along this continuum 
must be carefully done. For upon this selection "hinges both the ef-
ficacy of the administrative proc€ss and the judicial ability to protect 
individuals against agency abuse of power."3 Indeed, if the scope of 
review is too broad, agencies merely serve to conduct the cases to 
the courts for decision. Conversely, if the scope of review is too nar-
row, the legality of the agency's decision cannot be explored, and the 
right to review becomes meaningless.4 
In environmental matters, courts have had a particularly difficult 
time determining the scope of their review of agency decisions. En-
vironmental cases are often complex, involving highly scientific and 
technical issues. Courts have been wary of their ability to understand 
and correctly rule on these issues.5 At the same time, however, 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 204, at 579 (1976). 
2. The Court itself selects a standard for the scope of review, after first determining that 
judicial review is indeed available. For criteria governing the availability of judicial review see 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 143, at 429-30. 
3. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 204, at 579. 
4. Id. 
5. See Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through The Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 
817 (1977). 
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courts are aware of the special emphasis Congress has placed on en-
vironmental concerns as is evidenced in the policy goals expressed in 
statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).6 In 
environmental cases, courts must not only determine whether Con-
gress intended the courts to be vigilant enforcers of environmental 
legislation, but must also determine whether courts are qualified to 
conduct such strict review of environmental decisions. Courts are 
torn between adhering to traditional principles of administrative 
law7 and creating a broader scope of review in environmental cases. 
The enactment of NEP A 8 further complicated the selection of both 
a scope of review of agency decisions and a standard against which 
these decisions could be measured. NEP A expands the mandate of 
agencies to include consideration of environmental eoncerns.9 
Courts have been suspicious of the environmental decisions of agen-
cies whose primary purpose, by its very nature, affects the environ-
ment and have therefore been tempted to broaden the scope of their 
review.10 NEPA further confuses judicial review because it is 
unclear whether NEP A provides the standards that courts should 
use in conducting their review. Although it has been well established 
that section 102 of NEPA provides rather rigid mandates which the 
courts can enforce, the effect of section 101 is not so clearY 
Whether courts should demand compliance with the policies and 
goals expressed in this section is a question both of statutory inter-
pretation and of the abilities and competence of courts to carry out 
such review. 
In Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Ka,rlen, the 
Supreme Court addressed the question of the scope of review of 
agency decisions on environmental issues. Although the holding of 
the case is limited to the question of whether NEP A requires the 
agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other legitimate 
concerns, the language used by the Court may have implications for 
both the scope and standard of judicial review. In reaching the con-
clusion that agencies need not consider environmental conc:erns over 
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321·4347 (1976). 
7. See infra text at notes 16-20. 
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). See infra text at notes 70-75. 
9. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In this case, the court observed that "[p]erhaps. the greatest 
importance of NEP A is to require . . . agencies to consider environmental issues just as they 
consider other matters within their mandates." Id. at 1112. 
10. See Trubek, Allocating the Burden of Environmental Uncertainty: The NRC Interprets 
NEPA's Substantive Mandate, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 747, 750-51. 
11. See infra text at notes 70-75. 
12. 444 U.S. 223 (1980). 
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all others, the Court observed that "once an agency has made a deci-
sion subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a 
court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental 
consequences."13 In considering the standards to be used by the 
courts in evaluating agencies' decisions under NEP A, the Court 
noted that NEPA's mandates are "essentially procedural. "14 The ef-
fect of these Supreme Court pronouncements on the scope and 
standards of judicial review is the subject of this article. 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS 
Scope of review and standard of review are terms often confused 
by courts and agencies alike. The terms themselves can be difficult to 
distinguish. Grant P. Thompson has observed that discussion of 
these terms is difficult because the courts' articulated doctrines and 
actions may not always mesh.15 Moreover, because the terms are so 
closely related and must each be discussed by the court, courts have 
tended to discuss the scope and standard of review in the same 
sentence, saying something like "[t]he appropriate role for the court 
is to determine whether the agency has . . . ." In this simple 
sentence, the court indicates what it sees as the proper degree of 
scrutiny into an agency decision as well as the kinds of standards the 
court will use to evaluate the agency's decision. 
For purposes of this article, the scope of review will refer to the 
degree of scrutiny a court will use in evaluating an agency decision. 
The broadening and subsequent narrowing of the scope of review 
will be discussed in part A. 
The standard of review will be used to refer to the tests the courts 
apply to evaluate the agency decision. In NEP A cases, a discussion 
of the standard of review often involves the question whether the 
policy goals expressed in the first section of the Act can be used as 
standards for reviewing agency action. This will be discussed in part 
B. 
A. Administrative Law and Environmental Decision Making 
Traditionally, the scope of review of agency decision making has 
been a relatively narrow one.16 Judges have been reluctant to step in-
to areas in which agencies are the experts and have tended to defer 
13. [d. at 227. 
14. [d. (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun· 
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978». 
15. See Thompson, The Role of the Courts, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 206 (1974). 
16. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 204, at 579. 
82 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:79 
to agencies' judgment on matters within the agencies' mandates.17 
This tendency had been due in part to judges' feelings of in-
competence in the face of detailed, technical evidence18 and in part to 
the fact that agencies are created to resolve the questions committed 
to their discretion without help from the courts.19 
Professor Schwartz makes the observation that the traditional 
principles of administrative law are not rigid and inflexible. Rather, 
he notes that, although limited review is the norm where judges can-
not penetrate the mass of cases before them, when a judge does 
penetrate a case, the scope of his review will depend on his estimate 
of the justice of the case.20 
During the mid-1970's, commentators were observing an increased 
willingness on the part of courts to assume a more active role in the 
review process.21 A number of reasons for this trend have been ad-
vanced. Professor Anderson suggests that judges were beginning to 
feel guilty for having too long neglected to delve into the quality of 
decision making.22 He also observes that public interest law firms 
17. [d. at 579-80. See also Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Minn. 35:~, 72 N.W. 713 
(1897). The court there questioned its role in evaluating an agency decision on the rates set in 
the railroad industry. The court commented: 
It seems to us that such a judge is not fit to act in such a matter. It is not a case of the 
blind leading the blind, but of one who has always been deaf and blind insisting that 
he can see and hear better than one who has always had his eyesight and hearing, and 
has always used them to the utmost advantage in ascertaining the truth in regard to 
the matter in question. 
[d. at 716. 
18. See Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's Unburdening, 45 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 201 (1970). Judge Kaufman contends that he can determine the kind of ease he will be 
reviewing by observing the law clerk carry it in. "[I)f the briefs, records and appendices are so 
bulky that he has to haul them in relays, I know that once again the court is called upon to 
review a decision by an administrative agency." [d. 
19. [d. at 203. Judge Kaufman has observed that an agency may demand special respect 
from the courts not only on technical matters, but on its view of the law. 
20. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 204 at 579-81. Professor Schwartz elaborates: "[N)o review 
theory will deter them from what they perceive to be the correct result." Schwartz quotes 
Justice Weintraub as saying: "I incline to believe that a Judge will do what he thinks he should, 
no matter how we try to corral him." [d. 
21. See id. at 581; Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL EN· 
VIRONMENTAL LAW 278-83 (1974). See also Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 
841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). 
In Greater Boston Television, the court of appeals commented on its role in reviewing a deci-
sion of the FCC, saying that the court must 
intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate 
in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially 
from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a "hard 
look" at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-
making. 
[d. at 851 (citation omitted). 
22. Anderson, supra note 21, at 279. 
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had come into fashion and had begun bringing well-conceived suits 
against agency action.23 For whatever the reason, judges had begun 
to take a closer look at agency decisions-a development which 
prompted Judge Bazelon to comment, "we stand on the threshold of 
a new era in the history of the long and fruitful collaboration of ad-
ministrative agencies and reviewing courts."24 
With this broader scope of review of agency decisions came the 
question of what kind of'review would be afforded decisions affect-
ing the environment. 25 More specifically, should courts create an 
even broader, more strict review for environmental decision mak-
ing? Highlighting this question was the plethora of statutes that had 
been recently enacted in response to the country's growing en-
vironmental problems.26 Among these was the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969.27 NEPA expanded the mandate of 
agencies to include environmental decisions;28 yet, the courts' role in 
the review of these agency decisions under these statutes was still 
unclear. The question arose: should environmental matters be ex-
amined more closely in light of the general trend toward stricter 
review of agency decisions? 
1. Should the Courts Exercise a Stronger Role in Environmental 
Decision Making-the Trend Toward Judicial Vigilance 
There is no doubt that an enviropmentallawsuit is a unique breed 
of animal. There are four factors which make this kind of suit unlike 
any other. First, much of the evidence that is presented is highly 
scientific or technical-often there will be technical experts whose 
opinions are almost diametrically opposed. 29 Second, environmental 
litigation forces courts to balance quantities that cannot be measured 
-things like the value of scenery, or the probability of uncertain 
harm.30 Third, the consequences of an environmental decision are 
23. [d. 
24. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,597 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
25. There is some debate among authorities as to whether the general tendency toward 
stricter review preceded the trend toward stricter environmental review. Anderson, supra 
note 21, indicates that general reform paved the way for special treatment for environmental 
decisions. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the "new era" in general ad-
ministrative law was introduced by environmental cases. See Thompson, supra note 15, at 207. 
26. See, e.g., Environmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1536 (1976); The Clean Air 
Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1976); Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 
1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-4374 (1976). 
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). 
28. See Anderson, supra note 21, at 286-97. 
29. See Bazelon, supra note 5. 
30. See Thompson, supra note 15, at 193. 
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likely to be irreversible where harm is done to the environment.31 
Fourth, environmental matters are now governed largely by laws 
which are national in scope, leaving judges to deal not with a "case 
or controversy" but, rather, with a question of national environmen-
tal policy.32 Finally, many of the agencies whose decisions affect the 
environment have a distinctly antienvironmental bias. That is, their 
primary purpose, such as building roads or dams, by its nature 
adversely affects the environment.33 
In the early 1970's, courts were grappling with the question 
whether the uniqueness of environmental lawsuits should afford 
them a stricter standard of review. In Environmental Defense Fund, 
Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,34 the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia 
determined that a stricter standard was required. The court there 
reviewed an order of the Secretary of Agriculture refusing to sus-
pend or commence procedures to suspend the registration of the 
pesticide DDT. 35 In remanding the matter for further proceedings, 
Judge Bazelon, writing for the majority, observed that matters 
which "touch on fundamental personal interests in life, health and 
liberty ... have always had a special claim to judicial protection."36 
The court indicated its dedication to protecting these interests from 
"administrative arbitrariness" and observed that strict review of 
agency decisions was necessary.37 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court's expression was reiterated 
in the Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park 
v. Volpe. 3s In that case, the Supreme Court considered the question 
of the scope of the authority of the Secretary of Transportation 
31. See Sive, Environmental Decisionmaking: Judicial and Political Review, 28 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 827, 828 (1978). 
32. See Bazelon, supra note 5, at 831. 
33. Trubek, supra note 10, at 750-51. 
34. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
35. [d. at 588. This case was brought under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Roden-
ticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135K (1964). FIFRA is now codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136y (1976). 
This statute provides that for certain purposes, pesticides must be registered with the 
Secretary of Agriculture. To be registered a product must conform to the statutory standards 
for product safety. 439 F.2d at 588. 
36. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
37. [d. at 597-98. The court found no problem with the Secretary's findings of fact and 
noted that it was appropriate for the court to defer to the agency's findings of fact. The court 
did, however, take exception to the agency's explanation of its ultimate decision and stated 
that, in order to protect fundamental personal interests, "[c]ourts should require ad-
ministrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern their discretionary 
decisions in as much detail as possible." [d. at 598 (citation omitted). 
38. 401 U.S. 402, 404 (1971). See also Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the 
Role of the Courts, 122 U. PENN. L. REV. 509, 512 (1974). 
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under the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1966.39 The Court observed 
that the Act was one of many recent pieces of legislation designed to 
"curb the accelerating destruction of our country's natural beauty."4o 
The Court indicated that its review was to be "thorough, probing 
and in-depth"41 and remanded the case to the district court for 
plenary review. 42 In both Environmental Defense Fund and Overton 
Park, the courts emphasized the special nature of environmental 
matters as reasons for expanding the scope of courts' review. The 
District of Columbia Circuit emphasized the "fundamental personal 
interests"43 involved, while the Supreme Court indicated a desire to 
effectuate the statutes enacted to protect the country's natural beau-
ty.44 In analyzing Overton Park, the late Judge Leventhal has argued 
that the decision is premised on the court's recognition that environ-
mental questions should be reviewed more strictly. He wrote, "[t]he 
'paramount importance' attributed to environmental values serves 
to grab the court initially and causes the court to be especially atten-
tive in its review, and where necessary, to delve into the decisional 
process-to see whether the Government has acted to give due pro-
tection to the environment."45 
Other arguments have also been raised in favor of the expanded 
review suggested in Overton Park. Environmental lawyer David 
Sive listed three reasons favoring an expanded role for the judiciary 
during the "first explosion" of environmental law.46 First, Sive 
argues that the intricate value judgments involved in environmental 
decision making are better suited to the talents of judges rather than 
administratorsY Second, the newly enacted statutes would raise 
39. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-141 (Supp. V 1964). See specifically § 138. This act is now codified at 23 
U.S.C. §§ 101-156 (1976). It provides that the Secretary of Transportation may not authorize 
the use of federal funds to finance the construction of highways through public parks if a 
"feasible and prudent" alternative exists. If no such alternative can be found, the Secretary 
may authorize construction only if all "possible planning to minimize harm" to the park has 
been undertaken. The petitioners contended that the Secretary had violated these statutes by 
authorizing the construction of a highway through a public park in Memphis. 401 U.S. at 
404-06. 
40. 401 U.S. at 404. 
41. [d. at 415. 
42. [d. at 420. 
43. 439 F.2d at 598. 
44. 401 U.S. at 404. 
45. Leventhal, supra note 38, at 514. This is not to intimate that Overton Park is limited to 
this question. Other principles discussed in that case will be discussed in text at notes 113-15 
infra. 
46. Sive, supra note 31, at 827. See also Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer 
in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629-30 (1970). 
47. Sive, supra note 31, at 827. 
86 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:79 
problems of interpretation that should be reviewed by the courtS.48 
Third, the irreversibility of decisions affecting the environment 
demands strict review.49 For all of these reasons, therefore, many 
courts in the early 1970's, the early stages of environmental decision 
making, tended to treat environmental decisions more strictly than 
other decisions. 50 
2. Scope of Judicial Review in the Mid-to-Late 
1970's-The Narrowing Trend 
In the mid-to-Iate 1970s, the Supreme Court issued two opinions 
which indicated that the Court no longer intended to treat environ-
mental decisions differently. In 1977, the Court decided Kleppe v. 
Sierra Club. 51 The Court there addressed the issue of the scope of 
review applied by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
The question was whether NEP A requires the filing of a "compre-
hensive environmental impact statement" (EIS) for coal mining in 
the entire Northern Great Plains Region, or whether the various 
mining plans in the region are discrete enough to be considered local 
in nature. The Court found that the absence of any regional plan or 
proposal for mining in the area negated the need for an EIS.52 The 
Court rejected the claim that an EIS was necessary because all coal-
related activity in the area was environmentally related. 53 The 
Supreme Court found that the court of appeals had devised its own 
four part' 'balancing test" in reviewing the Department of Interior's 
decision not to file an EIS.54 Relying heavily on its assessment of the 
department's "high level of technical expertise," the Court held that 
the department's determination must be upheld. 55 
48. Id. at 827-28. 
49. Id. at 828. 
50. Some courts, however, explicitly refused to treat environmental decisions differently. 
See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d 
Cir. 1971). In Scenic Hudson, the court rejected the idea that Overton Park created a stricter 
review for environmental decisions, saying, "[t]o read these cases as sanctioning a new stand-
ard of judicial review for findings on matters of environmental policy is to misconstrue both 
the holdings in the cases and the nature of our remand in Scenic Hudson." The court stressed 
that in Overton Park the agency had merely failed to give adequate consideration to environ-
mental factors. Id. at 468. 
51. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
52. The local nature of these discrete projects removes them from the mandate of section 
102(2Xe) of NEPA, which requires that an Environmental Impact Statement be filed for 
"every major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. 
at 399-401. 
53. Id. at 414. 
54. Id. at 404-05. 
55. Id. at 412-14. 
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The second example of the Court's reluctance to treat environmen-
tal decisions differently can be seen in the Court's treatment of Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. 56 The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia had determined that procedures followed by the Atomic 
Energy Commission with regard to the licensing of nuclear reactors 
were inadequate. 57 The Supreme Court cited Kleppe for the principle 
that the only procedures imposed by NEP A are those contained in 
the plain language of the Act and determined that the court of ap-
peals "improperly intruded into the agency's decision-making proc-
ess." The Court observed that there was nothing in "the nature of 
the issues being considered," which would warrant such an intru-
sion.58 The Court intimated that the health issues involved in the 
licensing of nuclear reactors alone would not change the scope of 
review to be afforded. 59 
In both Kleppe and Vermont Yankee, the Court stressed that 
NEP A does not contemplate that a court should substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of 
its actions. In emphasizing traditional administrative law principles 
of judicial restraint, the Court may have been indicating that en-
vironmental decisions should no longer be treated differently. Much 
of the Court's reasoning seems to be based on the feeling that lower 
courts had let environmental decision making get out of hand-had 
forgotten the guidelines of administrative law and had let "judicial 
intervention run riot."60 
Sive has noted three reasons for the narrowing of the distinction 
between judicial review in environmental cases and the review of 
other types of administrative decisions.61 One is that many of the 
questions of statutory interpretation which arose after the passage 
of statutes like NEPA had already been settled by the late 1970'S.62 
Another is that, with increased familiarity with new environmental 
statutes, agencies were developing their own environmental exper-
tise and were learning to integrate environmental concerns with 
56. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
57. [d. The circuit court had found that the agency's environmental impact statement was 
defective in that it did not examine the alternative of energy conservation and did not address 
the disposal of nuclear waste. See Raymond, A Vermont Yankee in King Burger's Court: Can· 
straints on Judicial Review Under NEPA, 7 B.C. ENV. AFF. L. REV. 629 (1979). 
58. 435 U.S. at 525, 548. 
59. The significance of Vermont Yankee is not limited to this observation. The case will be 
discussed further in text at notes 117-29 infra. 
60. 435 U.S. at 556-57. 
61. Sive, supra note 31. 
62. [d. at 830. See supra text at notes 46-49. 
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their "primary" mandates.63 Third is that while, initially, the envi-
ronmentalists were the ones asking the courts to broaden their 
review for environmental concerns, as time wore on, the anti-
environmental forces began "borrowing" this technique. Since both 
sides could make equally good use of broad judicial review, litigants 
soon became wary of arguing for an expanded scope of review. 64 
B. Judicial Review Under NEPA 
After the court determines how closely it will look into an agency's 
decision, the next question is: what will the court look for-what 
standard must the agency meet? 
1. The Substance-Procedure Problem-Is NEPA 
"Law to Apply?" 
NEP A created special problems for courts trying to determine the 
appropriate scope and standard of their review. Nothing in the Act 
itself or in its legislative history specifically mentions judicial 
review.65 The courts were left to determine whether NEPA itself 
conferred jurisdiction, or whether review was available only through 
the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A). 66 In considering this ques-
tion, courts are guided by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
APA and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 67 There the 
Court considered the language of the AP A that permits judicial 
review of agency decisions except where prohibited by statute or 
where agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. The 
Court found these exceptions to be very limited ones and observed 
63. Sive, supra note 31, at 833. See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). There 
the Court placed particular emphasis on the expertise of the Department of the Interior in sus· 
taining its determination that a regional Environmental Impact Statement was not required 
for a coal mining plan in the Northern Great Plains Region. Id. at 412. 
64. Sive, supra note 31, at 832. To illustrate this phenomenon, Sive cites the brief submitted 
by respondents in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Sive observed that most of the cases cited by the NRDC were 
cases in which developmental interests were seeking to expand the scope of judicial review. 
Sive, supra note 31, at 831-32. 
65. Anderson, supra note 21, at 278. 
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). The APA establishes the minimum procedural requirements 
applicable to agency rulemaking and adjudication of disputes. It also provides for judicial 
review of administrative decisions. Section 701 provides that every final agency action is sub-
ject to review "except to the extent that (1) statutes provide judicial review; or (2) agency ac-
tion is committed to agency discretion by law." The APA also uses the criteria for reversing 
agency decisions. The Act provides, inter alia, that the agency's decision will be set aside if it 
is "arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law," or 
"without observance of procedure required by law." Id. §§ 706(2)(A), (2)(D). 
67. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
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that, where there is no "clear and convincing" evidence of a 
legislative intent to restrict judicial review, or, where there is any 
but the broadest statute, the courts can review agency decisions. 68 
Overton Park reduces the question whether the AP A applies in 
NEPA cases to whether NEPA is "law to apply."69 To answer this, 
the content of NEP A must be examined. 
Section 101 of NEPA70 describes the goals and objectives of the 
Act-it contains the substance of the Act.71 Section 102,72 on the 
other hand, is the procedural provision of the Act-it requires, 
among other things, the preparation of an EIS for any "Federal ac-
tion[s] significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."73 
It has been well established that section 102 is "law to apply" and 
tl>at, therefore, judicial review is available. 74 The question whether 
section 101 is "law to apply" is more complex. Considerable debate 
has arisen over whether section 101 is merely "fancy paper" III 
68. [d. at 410 (citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)). 
69. [d. 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976). 
71. The Act encourages all tederal plans :0: 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding 
generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive and esthetically and culturally pleas-
ing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to 
health or safety or other undesirable and unintended consequences; 
(4) preserve important historic, cultural and natural aspects of our national heritage, and 
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of in-
dividual choice; 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards 
of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recy-
cling of depletable resources. 
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(I)-(b)(6) (1976). 
72. [d. § 4332. 
73. An environmental impact statement is required for legislation and other major federal 
actions which will affect the environment. The EIS must contain a discussion of the en-
vironmental impact of the proposed action, adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided, alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship of long-term effects and short-
term uses of the environment, and any irreversible commitments of resources which the pro-
posed project will require. [d. Other major provisions of this section mandate that agencies: (1) 
utilize natural and social services and environmental design arts in planning and choosing proj-
ects; and (2) develop procedures which will give appropriate consideration to environmental 
values. [d. 
74. Courts have had little trouble enforcing the mandates of § 102. See generally RODGERS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 7.3, 7.4 (1977). See also, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. 
United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
942 (1972). There the Court observed that § 102 of NEPA "sets a high standard for the agen-
cies, a standard which must be rigorously enforced by reviewing courts." [d. at 1114. 
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which the procedural requirements of section 102 are wrapped, or 
whether section 101 contains standards or criteria against which 
agency decisions can be weighed. Much of this debate has centered 
around the peculiar characteristics of environmentallitigation75 and 
the ability of courts to handle these substantive questions. Before the 
question whether NEP A is "law to apply" can be answered, it is 
necessary to determine whether courts are competent to apply this 
law. It is helpful to examine here the views of two vocal participants 
in this debate, Judge Bazelon and the late Judge Leventhal, both of 
the District of Columbia Circuit Court. 
3. The Substance-Procedure Debate-Can Courts 
Handle Substantive Review? 
Judge Bazelon has taken the position that courts should not under-
take substantive review in environmental cases. 76 He bases much of 
his argument on the fact that much of the evidence presented in en-
vironmental cases is mathematical or scientific. 77 Judge Bazelon con-
tends that judges are "technically illiterate" and that their review of 
agency decisions would be "dangerously unreliable."78 The ap-
propriate role for the courts is to "scrutinize and monitor" the 
decision-making process-the agency's compliance with pro-
cedures-to make sure that it is complete. 79 The court's function is to 
insure that the agency generates a complete record in whieh factual 
issues are fully developed;80 in other words, the court must insure 
that the agency has complied with NEPA's procedural provisions. 
Judge Leventhal, on the other hand, believed that courts are com-
petent, or can become competent, to deal with the issues that would 
arise in substantive review.81 Leventhal indicated that Congress left 
review of environmental decisions under NEP A to the courts (rather 
than to itself or to a superagency) because of the courts' special 
characteristics. Courts, he argued, are uniquely able to combine a 
supervisory role with an attitude of restraint. They are familiar with 
principles of equity and statutory interpretation, and are divorced 
from the tribulations of politics.82 Judge Leventhal noted that the 
75. See supra text at notes 29-33. 
76. Bazelon, supra note 5. See also Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 
F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
77. 541 F.2d at 67. (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
78. Id. 
79. Bazelon, supra note 5, at 823. 
80.Id. 
81. Leventhal, supra note 38. 
82. Id. at 515-17. 
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complex nature of the evidence should not hinder judicial review. He 
believed that courts have always had a special interest in the 
knowledge of "how matters are proven" and that very little else is 
needed to deal with environmental matters.83 He urged that, 
through "diligence and attentiveness," courts will be able to master 
the scientific data that is presented.84 
4. Status of the Sub stance-Procedure Problem 
in the Late 1970's 
With valid arguments on either side of the substance-procedure 
debate, courts began lining up on either side of the issue. By 1979, 
most courts had recognized NEP A as "law to apply" under the AP A 
and used NEP A to determine the rationality or arbitrariness of the 
agency decision.85 Two circuits initially ruled that NEP A created no 
"law to apply," but later realized that the APA gives courts the 
authority to review while section 101 of NEPA provides standards 
for that review.86 The Tenth Circuit Court has remained steadfast in 
its contention that NEP A is purely procedural. 87 
Substantive review has been afforded under NEP A in a number of 
circumstances to allow courts to reverse agency decisions found to 
be offensive to the principles of NEPA. Generally, the more factual 
the question before the court, the more likely the court is to conduct 
a strict substantive review.88 Conversely, the more the question in-
83. Id. at 533. 
84. Id. It should also be noted that the debate over the courts' abilities to handle scientific 
matters has encouraged commentators to propose alternative solutions to this problem. Judge 
Leventhal addresses the question of whether there should be "Scientific Courts" appointed to 
take jurisdiction of such matters, or whether special masters should sit with the judge to ex· 
plain the complicated material. Id. at 541-54. 
85. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 606 
F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 591 F.2d 
1339,9 ENVTL L. REP. 20,105 (4th Cir. 1979); Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978), 
rev'd sub nom. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Jackson 
County, Missouri v. Jones, 571 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1978); Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974), affd per curiam, 371 F. Supp. 
1004,4 ENVTL L. REP. 20,120 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th 
Cir. 1973); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973). 
86. Compare Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974) and Pizitz v. Volpe, 467 F.2d 
208 (5th Cir. 1972) with Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 
1977) and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 
1974) (Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway). 
87. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971). 
88. Leed, The National Environmental Policy Act oj 1969: Is the Fact ojCompliance a Pro-
cedural or Substantive Question?, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 311-19 (1975). 
An example of this is the careful scrutiny given to an agency decision that an EIS is not re-
quired. See Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973). There the court in-
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volves the agency's substantive decision to carry out a project, the 
more confused the courts become about the proper standard of their 
review.89 
Courts reviewing questions concerning the agency's scrutiny of 
the factors involved in environmental decision making have come up 
with standards of review much stricter than the traditional "ar-
bitrary and capricious" standard. Two of these standards are the 
"reasoned decision-making" test and the "substantial inquiry" test. 90 
An example of the "reasoned decision-making" test can be found 
in International Harvester Company v. Ruckelshaus.91 In Interna-
tional Harvester, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia con-
sidered automobile manufacturers' claims that the EPA had wrongly 
refused to grant a one-year suspension of the emission control stand-
ards of the Clean Air Act. The agency had determined tha.t the auto-
motive industry had failed to show that the technology needed for 
compliance was not available.92 Judge Leventhal, writing for the 
court, waded through extensive, complicated evidence9:! and con-
cluded that granting an extension would be the only outcome of a 
"reasoned decision-making process."94 The court explained "reasoned 
decision making" as a process whereby the court undertakes a 
perceptive study of the record "to satisfy itself that the agency has 
exercised a reasoned discretion, with reasons that do not deviate or 
dicated that, in the wake of Overton Park, strict review was required for an EIS threshold 
decision, saying, "[t]he spirit of the Act would die aborning if a facile, ex parte decision that 
the project was minor . . . were too well shielded from impartial review . . . . The primary 
decision ... must be subject to inspection under a more searching standard." [d. at 466. 
89. Leed, supra note 88 at 314-15. Compare Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 
487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973) (the court questioned its authority to revise an agency's decision 
where all NEPA's procedures had been fulfilled and finally determined that it did not have the 
authority to apply the standards of section 101); with Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of 
Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974) (where the court determined that the agency's deci-
sion to proceed with the environmentally controversial Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway proj-
ect should be reviewed under the standards of § 101). 
90. Thompson, supra note 15, at 211. 
91. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
92. [d. at 622. 
93. Judge Bazelon in his concurring opinion balked at the court's scrutiny of substantive 
matters, arguing instead that the court should scrutinize any procedures used by the agency to 
see if they provide a "framework for principled decision-making," [d. at 650-53. Judge 
Bazelon does, however, agree that principled, or reasoned, decision-making is the goal of 
judicial review: "My Brethren and I are reaching for the same end . . . a 'reaBoned decision' 
through different means." [d. at 652. 
94. [d. at 650. The court did not issue an order for the suspension because certain 
preliminary determinations had not been made by the Administrator. The eourt, instead, 
remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. [d. 
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ignore the ascertainable legislative intent."95 The decision made by 
the Administrator was characterized by the court as leaving a "resi-
due of uncertainty that beclouds. "96 The court was skeptical of the 
reliability of the administrator's methodology; the court cited in-
stances in which the Administrator failed to state assumptions and 
support calculations.97 A court applying the "reasoned decision-
making" test could not uphold such a decision, not because it found 
the decision to be "arbitrary," but because the information con-
sidered by the agency was not reliable or certain enough to be 
reasonable. Phrased more succinctly, in reasoned decision making, 
"[w]hat one senses is a willingness of the court to sift finely through 
the fabric of the decision at hand to ensure that at every possible 
point of dispute the factors are openly considered and fairly 
weighed. "98 As applied by Judge Leventhal in International 
Harvester, the reasoned decision-making test allows the court to 
delve into the substance of the agency decision in order to improve 
the quality of the decision itself.99 
In a NEPA case, the procedural requirements of section 102 serve 
as guidelines for the court in assessing the kinds of relevant en-
vironmental factors that must be weighed. 10o The court looks to see 
whether the environmental impact assessment (EIA) contains the 
type of reasoned elaboration required to support an administrative 
determination. This may seem to be a merely procedural review to 
insure compliance with section 102 of NEP A, but it is, in fact, 
substantive review because it looks at the reasoning of the agency to 
determine the propriety of the results. In City of Rochester v. United 
States Postal Service, 101 the court evaluated the EIA prepared by the 
Postal Service for construction of a new facility. The Postal Service 
had concluded that the facility would not "significantly affect the 
quality of the human environment" under section 102 of NEPA. The 
court disagreed with the Postal Service, finding not that section 102 
had not been complied with, but that 
95. Id. at 648 (citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n. 
444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). 
96. Id. at 644. 
97. Id. at 645-46. 
98. Thompson, supra note 15, at 215. 
99. Id. at 214-15. 
100. See, e.g., City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976) 
discussed in text at notes 101-02 infra. 
101. City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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[t]here are a multiplicity of factors, some of which were men-
tioned in the EIA and several of which were not, which indicate 
that substantial environmental degradation may result from the 
challenged project. The EIA ... falls short of the type of 
reasoned elaboration which must be required to support an ad-
ministrative determination of non-substantiality under the 
EPA. 102 
The "substantial inquiry" test is well illustrated by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court's decision in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger. 103 In this case, 
the General Services Administration (GSA) had decided that the con-
struction of a federal office building would not significantly affect 
the quality of the human environment.104 The GSA argued that its 
decision could not be disturbed unless it was found to be arbitrary 
and capricious. The court disagreed and applied a more searching 
standard,106 stating that the decision must be made in a two-step 
process. First, the court must see if the factors which plaintiffs have 
charged would degrade the environment. Second, the court must 
review the evidence to see if the agency conclusion was 
"reasonable." 106 
Both the "reasonableness" test and the "substantial inquiry" test 
are stricter applications of the "arbitrary and capricious" test of 
Overton Park. The next question is whether the stricter review of 
the reasonableness test and the ability of courts to conduct substan-
tial review under section 102 affects the willingness of courts to use 
section 101 as a standard of review. 
The question whether section 101 of NEP A can be used as stand-
ards against which to measure the arbitrariness of an agency deci-
sion has been a difficult one for courts to decide.107 In En'l)ironmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 108 the Eighth Circuit con-
102. [d. at 973. 
103. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973). 
104. [d. at 465. 
105. [d. at 466. 
106. [d. at 466-67. 
107. See Leed, supra note 88. See also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United 
States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971); Hanley v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
In Calvert Cliffs', the Court observed that "the substantive policy of the Act is It flexible one. 
It leaves room for a responsible exercise of discretion and may not require particular substan-
tive results in particular problematic instances." 449 F.2d at 1112. The court indicated that 
§ 101 of the NEPA provides flexible duties for agencies. 
The court in Hanley v. Mitchell gave a literal interpretation to the goals in § 101, to find that 
noise, traffic and crime all affect the urban environment within the meaning of NEP A. 460 
F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972). 
108. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). 
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sidered whether the administrative decision that a dam should be 
constructed was reviewable by the court on the merits.109 The court 
observed that section 101 of NEP A imposes upon agencies an obliga-
tion to preserve and enhance the environment.110 The court stated 
"[t]he unequivocal intent of NEPA is to require agencies to consider 
and give effect to the environmental goals set forth in the Act, not 
just to file detailed impact studies which will fill governmental ar-
chives."l1l The court concluded that since agencies are required to 
comply with section 101 of NEP A courts must have an obligation to 
review agency decisions on these grounds.112 To find the appropri-
ate standard of review, the court looked to the Supreme Court's 
holding in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.113 As applied 
to NEP A cases, the Overton Park test requires the court to deter-
mine first, whether the agency reached its decision after a full, good 
faith consideration and balancing of environmental factors, and sec-
ond, whether according to the standards in section 101 the "actual 
balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly 
gave insufficient weight to environmental values."114 The court was 
also careful to note that "[t]he court is not empowered to substitute 
its judgment for that of the agency."116 After this careful analysis of 
the scope and standard of the court's review, however, the court 
found that the decision of the Corps of Engineers was not arbitrary. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court issued Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,117 an 
opinion which contained a threatening message for the future of 
substantive review. By stating that NEPA's provisions are "essen-
tially procedural," the Court cast doubt on the notion that section 
101 of NEP A could be enforced in the courts.11S Vermont Yankee in-
volved the adequacy of procedures for the licensing of nuclear reac-
109. Id. at 293. 
110. Id. at 297. 
111. Id. at 298. 
112. Id. 
113. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See supra text at notes 67-69. 
114. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289,300 (8th Cir. 
1972) (citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 
1009, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). However, in National Helium Corp. v. Morton, the court deter-
mined that Overton Park does not govern the scope and standard of review when the pro-
cedural requirements of § 102 of NEPA have been complied with. 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 
1973). 
115. 470 F.2d at 300 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971)). 
116. Id. at 300-01. 
117. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
118. Id. at 558. 
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tors. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had found 
that the procedures used by the Atomic Energy Commission were 
not sufficient to "ventilate the issues" and remanded the question 
for further proceedings.119 The Supreme Court questioned whether 
the lower court had merely determined that the record presented by 
the agency was inadequate, or whether the court of appeals had 
found that the procedures followed by the agency were inadequate. 
The Court decided that the lower court had found the proceedings to 
be inadequate120 and indicated that this was a "serious departure" 
from the basic tenet of administrative law that agencies should be 
free to fashion their own rules of procedure.121 The Court chastised 
the circuit court for "engrafting their own notions of proper proce-
dures upon agencies entrusted with substantial functions by Con-
gress."122 The Court observed that, if courts were continually to 
review agency procedures to determine whether the procedures 
employed were designed to reach the "correct" result, judicial 
review would be totally unpredictable and agencies would be forced 
to conduct full adjudicatory procedures in every instance.123 
The Court also considered the question whether NEP A would 
allow courts to require agencies "to develop new procedures to ac-
complish the innovative task of implementing NEP A through rule 
making. "124 The Court observed that the only procedural re-
quirements imposed by NEP A are the ones stated in the Act.125 The 
Court then made a "further observation of some relevance to this 
case."126 Pointing out that policy decisions, such as the decision to 
try nuclear power, are matters for the legislature and should not be 
reexamined by the courts, the Court stated: 
NEPA does set forth significant substantial goals for the Na-
tion, but its mandate to agencies is essentially procedural. It is 
to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision, not 
necessarily a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or this 
court would have reached had they been members of the deci-
sionmaking unit of the agency. 127 
119. Aeschilman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 
1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977); Natural Resources Defense Council v. United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 
1090 (1977). 
120. 435 U.S. at 540-42. 
121. Id. at 543. 
122. Id. at 525. 
123. Id. at 546-47. 
124. Id. at 548. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 557. 
127. Id. at 558 (citations omitted). 
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In this manner, the Supreme Court appears to have been chastising 
the lower court for effectuating its own policy judgments on the 
value of nuclear energy for those of Congress and the agency. 
The Vermont Yankee Court did not consider whether the "substan-
tive goals" of NEP A provide standards against which to judge agen-
cy action, as the question before it was a procedural one. However, 
the statement that NEPA's mandate is "essentially procedural" 
could raise doubts in the minds of courts that had used NEPA to 
modify or nullify agency action found to be offensive to the substan-
tive goals of the Act. 128 At least one observer found this concern 
with Vermont Yankee easy to dismiss. Professor Rodgers observed: 
The decision is out of step, nonetheless, with the dominant 
strains of the close scrutiny doctrine that has become 
synonymous with contemporary judicial review of technological 
decision making by the agencies. For this reason, Vermont 
Yankee is likely to be isolated and confined; the banishment of 
the decision should not be greatly mourned. 129 
III. STRYCKER'S BAY NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL, INC. V. KARLEN 
By the late 1970's, environmental concerns were being afforded a 
broader scope of review than other agency decisions, although the 
scope was less broad than it had been. Also, although many circuit 
courts had begun using the substantive provisions of NEP A as 
guidelines in evaluating agency decisions, recent rumblings in the 
Supreme Court had cast doubt on this approach. It was within this 
framework that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the 
litigation which culminated with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen. 130 
A. The Lower Court Decisions 
The litigation in Strycker's Bay involved an urban development 
project on the West Side of New York City.131 In 1962, the City Plan-
ning Commission (the Commission) and the United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began forming a 
plan for the renewal of twenty square blocks of the city which 
became known as the West Side Urban Renewal Area.132 The funds 
128. See supra notes 85-86. 
129. Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee; Environmental Law Under Close Scruni-
ty. 67 GEO. L. J. 699, 727 (1979). The decision in Strycker's Bay calls this reasoning into ques-
tion. See infra text at notes 174-76. 
130. 444 U.S. 223 (1980). 
131. Greenhouse, Top Court Backs Housing Project on the West Side, New York Times, Jan. 
8, 1980, at Bl, col. 1. 
132. 444 U.S. at 224. 
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for this project would come both from private parties and from 
federal programs. 133 The original plan called for a mix of 70 percent 
middle-income housing and 30 percent low-income housing.134 In 
1969, after much progress had been made on the project, local agen-
cies in New York determined that the proposed number of low-
income units would not satisfy an increased need for such units. 135 
Accordingly, the Commission modified the plan and designated one 
site, Site 30, as the location of a high-rise building containing 160 
units of low-income housing,136 
The plaintiffs in this action were corporations and individuals who 
had invested in the neighborhood, as well as a community group 
named CONTINUE (Committee of Neighbors to Insure a Normal 
Urban Environment) whose membership was composed primarily of 
middle-income housing owners.137 The plaintiffs feared the conver-
sion of Site 30 to low-income housing would cause the entire neigh-
borhood to deteriorate. 13B They alleged, inter alia, that the decision 
to fund public housing at Site 30 was illegal in that the agency 
charged with the administration of this project did not comply with 
NEPA.139 The defendants, the United States Government, the State 
of New York, the City of New York, and the Community Group called 
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Association, claimed that the changes 
were necessary to provide adequate low-income housing and that no 
violation of NEP A existed.140 
In the first round of litigation, the district court found that section 
102(2)(E) of NEPA141 did not require any agency to study alterna-
tives to projects which did not present "significant environmental ef-
133. [d. It was the decision to use federal funds for this project which was the 'major federal 




137. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1053 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974). The names of the parties changed a number of times during the nine-year course of this 
litigation. The original plaintiffs were Trinity Episcopal School Corporation and Trinity Hous-
ing Company, Inc., occupants of site 24 of the area. They instituted this action on October 4, 
1971, against George Romney, as Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, the City of New York, and the State of New York. On April 13, 1972, Strycker's 
Bay Neighborhood Council, an organization favoring the construction of low-in,~ome housing, 
joined as intervenor-defendants. On July 18, 1973, Ronald N. Karlen and Alvin C. Hudgins, 
middle-income housing owners and the Committee of Neighbors to Insure a Normal Urban En-
vironment (CONTINUE) moved to join as intervenor-plaintiffs; their motion was granted on 
April 22, 1974, during trial in the District Court. [d. at 1047 n.2. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. at 1048. 
140. [d. at 1047. 
141. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(e) (1976). 
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fects" and would, therefore, not require an Environmental Impact 
Statement. The Second Circuit reversed the district court, stressing 
that NEP A requires alternatives be considered with respect to "any 
proposal" involving unresolved conflicts over the use of available 
resources. The circuit court concluded that the failure to discuss 
alternatives required a remand142 and proceeded to list factors which 
could have been considered by HUD in analyzing alternatives.143 
On remand, the district court considered the Special Environmen-
tal Clearance and Study, a 200-page study of alternatives prepared 
by HUD in response to the circuit court's opinion. The study 
evaluated nine alternatives to Site 30 and rejected them all. The 
leading contender, Site 9, was found to be environmentally 
"superior."144 Construction on Site 9, however, would result in a 
delay of at least two years in the construction project and HUD con-
cluded that, "measured against the environmental costs associated 
with the minimum two-year delay, the benefits seem insufficient to 
justify a mandated substitution of sites."145 The district court, hav-
ing extensively reviewed the report, was satisfied that alternatives 
had been examined, that factors suggested by the Second Circuit had 
been considered, and that the mandate of the circuit court had been 
complied with.146 It, therefore, upheld HUD's decision to build on 
Site 30.147 
The circuit court, however, was not satisfied. Before analyzing the 
decision of the district court, the circuit court referred to the scope 
of its reviewing powers and concluded that it was to use the substan-
tive standards of NEP A to review the merits of the agency decision 
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the AP A.148 The 
court then turned to the decision reached by HUD and evaluated it 
against NEP A section 101(1) which mandates that "the respon-
sibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for suc-
142. Trinity Episcopal School Corp v. Romney, 523 F. 2d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1975). 
143. [d. at 94. The list read: 
Alternative locations or sites; alternative of not building; alternative designs both in 
use of site and in size of individual units and number of total units; dispersal of the low 
income units on more sites in the project area; alternative measures for compensating 
or mitigating environmental impacts; and alternatives requiring action of a 
significantly different nature which would provide similar benefits with different im-
pacts such as rehabilitation of existing buildings in the Area as public housing proj-
ects. 
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1980). 
144. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1978). 
145. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
146. [d. at 218. 
147. [d. 
148. 590 F.2d at 43. 
100 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:79 
ceeding generations" be fulfilled. 149 The court concluded that HUD 
had violated this mandate by choosing an alternative that would con-
centrate the area's low-income residents "at least for the life of the 
structure."160 The court also observed that the factor of project 
delay outranked all other considerations in HUD's decisions, and 
concluded that "delay is not to be regarded as an overriding factor 
and that environmental factors, such as crowding low-income hous-
ing into a concentrated area, should be given determinative 
weight."161 In its remand instructions, the court stated "what is not 
to be done . . . [is] the construction of a high-rise apartment 
building exclusively for low-income families on Site 30."162 The court 
then instructed HUD to reach a solution that would avoid such con-
centration.15s 
Despite the strong language used by the court, its actual holding is 
somewhat ambiguous. It is difficult to determine from the language 
in the decision whether the court actually found that HUD's decision 
was arbitrary and capricious. The only time the court specifically 
mentioned the arbitrary and capricious standard is when it defined 
its role as being that of determining whether the agency decision was 
arbitrary and capricious in light of the substantive standards of 
NEP A.154 The court never stated directly that the decision was ar-
bitrary and capricious. There are two possible interpretations of the 
circuit court's decision to remand. The first is that, by saying that 
delay cannot be an overriding factor, the court meant that the agen-
cy failed to consider other legitimate factors. A decision based on an 
inadequate consideration of all the factors involved would indeed be 
arbitrary and capricious. This is basic to the holding in Overton 
Park155 that a determination of arbitrary and capricious involves 
"consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a 
clear error of judgment." 156 Support for this analysis is found not on-
ly in the fact that the circuit court recognized the standard of review 
as being the arbitrary and capricious test, but also in the court's 
detailed description of HUD's report which may indicate that the 
court felt HUD had ignored segments of the evidence. 167 
149. Id. at 44. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 45. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 43. 
155. See supra text at notes 113·15. 
156. 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
157. See Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39,42 (2d Cir. 1978). Justice Marshall found this inter-
pretation to be convincing. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 
223, 229-30 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). An example of the court's criticism of the 
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A better interpretation of the circuit court's holding, however, is 
that the court was dissatisfied with the weight that the agency had 
assigned to the factors it considered. A literal reading of the court's 
statement, "we hold that delay is not to be regarded as an over-
riding factor and that environmental factors, such as crowding low-
income housing into a concentrated area, should be given determina-
tive weight,"158 supports this interpretation. The court does not in-
dicate that legitimate factors such as social environmental impact 
were not considered, but rather that HUD had allowed these factors 
to be overridden by the factor of delay. This holding goes beyond the 
method of review which combines the substantive standards of 
NEP A with the arbitrary and capricious standard of the AP A.159 In 
mandating compliance with section 101 of NEPA without finding 
that the consideration of factors was arbitrary and capricious, the 
circuit court was giving section 101 of NEP A more impact than most 
courts had been willing to apply.160 When the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated that section 101 of NEPA sets forth the standards 
for judicial review of agency action in Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Corps of Engineers, it was careful to hinge its review on the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard found in the AP A. 161 In Karlen v. 
Harris, the Second Circuit was not so careful; the holding raised 
questions as to whether the arbitrary and capricious standard had 
been applied at all. 162 Even if it were argued that the Karlen court 
was attempting to use a stricter standard of review, as the Fifth Cir-
cuit did in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger,163 the analogy would fail. In 
Save Our Ten Acres, the court conducted substantive review, while 
rejecting the arbitrary and capricious standard in favor of one that 
would more strictly enforce the goals of NEP A.164 The Fifth Circuit, 
however, was careful to emphasize the limits of its authority and 
stated, "[t]his decision has not the slightest intent of indicating what 
ruling should eventuate from the retest we require."165 Again, the 
Second Circuit was not so careful, as it stated quite forcefully that it 
agency's evaluation is the court's observation that the conclusion of the City's analysis was at 
variance with the facts stated by the parties in their briefs. 590 F.2d at 43. 
158. 590 F .2d at 44. 
159. See supra text at notes 85-87. 
160. Id. 
161. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). The court stated that "[t]he court must then determine, 
according to the standards set forth in §§ 101(b) and 102(1) of the Act, whether 'the actual 
balance of costs and benefits that was struck' was arbitrary." Id. at 300. The court ultimately 
determined that the agency action under review was not arbitrary. 
162. 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978). See supra text at notes 154-60. 
163. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973). 
164. See supra text at notes 90-106. 
165. 472 F.2d at 467. 
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would not allow construction of a low-income apartment building on 
Site 30 and instructed HUD to find a solution that would avoid a con-
centration of low-income families in the area.166 The circuit court's 
decision takes substantive review far beyond the arbitrary and 
capricious test and has been characterized as the "high-water mark 
among the 'substantive NEP A cases.' "167 
B. The Supreme Court Opinion 
The case was brought before the Supreme Court on a \Vrit of Cer-
tiorari. The Court declined to entertain oral argument and, on 
January 7,1980, the Court issued a brief per curiam opinion. 168 The 
heart of the Court's decision is contained in one paragraph. The 
Court considered only the question whether courts could require 
agencies to give "determinative weight" to environmental consider-
ations in agency decision making. 169 
The Supreme Court initially commended the court of appeals for 
recognizing that its role was defined by the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of the AP AYo The Court, however, did not interpret the 
circuit court as holding that HUD's decision was "arbitrary and 
capricious."I71 Instead the Court found that the circuit court had 
ordered HUD to reorder its priorities, a mandate that finds no sup-
port in either NEP A or the AP A.172 Accordingly, the Court reversed 
the judgment of the court of appeals. l73 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on its decision in Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,174 where the Court had 
stated that, while NEP A establishes "significant substantive goals 
for the nation," the duties it imposes are "essentially procedural." 175 
The Court reiterated that the goal of NEP A was to "insure a fully-
informed and well-considered decision" and concluded that, pursu-
ant to Vermont Yankee, a court is not required to elevate environ-
166. 590 F.2d at 45. 
167. Charting the Boundaries of NEPA's Substantive Mandate: Strycker's Bay 
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,039, 10,043 (1980). 
168. 444 U.S. 223 (1980). 
169. Id. at 227. The Supreme Court's view of the lower court's holding was that "the ap-
pellate court held that such delay could not be 'an overriding factor' in HUD's decision to pro-
ceed with the development." 
170. Id. at 226. 
171. Id. at 228 n.2. The Court here observed that if the court of appeals had found HUD's 
decision to be "arbitrary and capricious," plenary review might be warranted. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 228. 
174. 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also supra text at notes 56-59. 
175. Id. at 558. 
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mental concerns over other appropriate considerations. 176 
Moreover, the Court stated that, once an agency has complied with 
NEPA's procedural requirements, "the only role for a court is to in-
sure that the agency has considered the environmental conse-
quences."177 The Court cited Kleppe v. Sierra Club178 for the prin-
ciple that courts cannot interject themselves within the area left to 
agency discretion.179 
Justice Marshall in dissent disagreed with the Court's interpreta-
tion of the court of appeal's holding. He believed the Second Circuit 
had found HUD's decision to be "arbitrary and capricious."18o He 
argued that oral argument was necessary for a proper understand-
ing of the issues involved in the case. 181 Marshall pointed to HUD's 
own admission that adverse environmental consequences would 
result from the proposed action and concluded that the circuit court 
had found the decision to be arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, 
had not "substitute[ d) its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
environmental consequences of the action."182 
Marshall also indicated that the Court's reliance on Vermont 
Yankee was tenuous. His concerns with Vermont Yankee were 
twofold. First, he expressed doubt over whether Vermont Yankee 
could really be considered precedent. The relevant passage quoted 
by the Court in Strycker's Bay was characterized by the Court in 
Vermont Yankee as a "further observation of some relevance to this 
case."183 This "observation," Marshall noted, was the Court's 
response to the court of appeals' attempt to assert its own views on 
nuclear energy under the guise of judicial review,184 and, therefore, 
Vermont Yankee should be limited to its facts. 
Marshall's second concern was that the majority had used Ver-
mont Yankee to limit judicial review "solely to the factual issue of 
whether the agency 'considered' environmental consequences."185 
Not only was this not the test that Vermont Yankee calls for, Mar-
shall contended, but it was an "essentially mindless" test that could 
176. 444 U.S. at 227. 
177. [d. 
178. 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). See supra text at notes 51-60. 
179. 444 U.S. at 227-28. The Court also cited FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 
423 U.S. 326 (1976). 
180. 444 U.S. at 228-29 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also supra text at note 157. 
181. [d. at 23l. 
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allow an agency decision to stand "even if that agency may have ef-
fectively decided to ignore [environmental] factors in reaching its 
conclusion."186 
IV. ANALYSIS OF STRYCKER'S BAY 
A. A Narrow Interpretation of Strycker's Bay 
Strycker's Bay should be interpreted narrowly. It is unlikely that 
the Supreme Court was attempting to use this case to make broad 
pronouncements on the role of the judiciary in environmental deci-
sion making. There are a number of factors favoring a narrow inter-
pretation of Strycker's Bay. 
First, the decision was per curiam. The Court did not entertain 
oral argument, presumably because the case was considered a simple 
one. 187 Indeed, the issue addressed by the Court was a narrow 
one-whether NEP A requires that environmental factors be given 
determinative weight.188 The Court answered that question in the 
negative, relying heavily on the reasoning in previous cases. There is 
nothing "new" in the Court's analysis, except for its pronouncement 
that the court felt that it was blazing new trails in environmental 
decision making. Rather, the Court appeared to be reiterating old 
principles of administrative law solely for the purpose of restraining 
a wayward circuit court. The lower court had specifically directed 
HUD to reach a solution which would avoid having a high eoncentra-
tion of low income familes in one area. The Court's desire to em-
phasize the error of this holding is evidenced by the Court's 
reference to FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line COrp.189 The 
Transcontinental Gas case did not deal specifically with NEP A, but 
rather with the courts' reviewing authority under the Natural Gas 
Act. 190 Much of this decision focused on the role of courts in remand-
ing matters to agencies for further consideration. The lower court 
had remanded a decision to an agency and had requested that the 
agency reach a particular result. The Supreme Court overturned this 
decision, saying that courts must refrain from "essentially adminis-
trative" functions. 191 Although courts may remand to agencies to ob-
186. Id. at 231. 
187. Id. at 228. 
188. Id. at 227. 
189. 423 U.S. 326 (1976). 
190. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w, specifically § 717r(b). 
191. 423 U.S. at 333-34. 
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tain more evidence, it is the agency alone that determines how the 
evidence should be developed and what effect this evidence should 
have on its prior decision.192 By emphasizing that a court cannot 
enter the area of discretion of an agency and by citing Transconti-
nental Gas, the Court seems to have been chastising the lower court 
for failing to adhere to traditional administrative law principles by 
requiring an agency to reach a particular result. 
It is also unlikely that the Supreme Court would have chosen 
Strycker's Bay as an opportunity to develop new principles in en-
vironmental decision making, as the case did not contain many of the 
qualities that set environmental decisions apart from other deci-
sions. There were no scientific or technical questions involved and 
the agency involved was not by its nature antienvironmental. 
Moreover, the issue before the Supreme Court was so narrow that 
there was no problem of balancing values and no threat of irrepar-
able harm to the environment. If the Supreme Court had wanted to 
cut back on the ability of courts to conduct a substantive review of 
agency decision making, it would have done so in a case where fac-
tors weighing against judicial review were present.193 Accordingly, 
the only general principle which should be taken from Strycker's Bay 
is that, under NEP A, agencies need not elevate environmental con-
cerns above other legitimate concerns. 194 
B. Implications of Strycker's Bay 
1. Scope of Review 
Strycker's Bay should have no effect on the scope of review of 
agency decisions. The trend towards treating environmental deci-
sions with a broader scope of review has largely passed, and the cur-
rent trend is towards treating environmental decisions less "dif-
ferently."195 Strycker's Bay will not encourage courts to expand the 
scope of their review because the decision stresses judicial 
restraint,196 Neither, however, will the decision encourage courts to 
narrow the scope of their review, for the Court merely reiterates the 
long-standing principle that a court may not interject itself within 
the area of discretion of the agencies. 197 
192. [d. at 333. 
193. See supra text at notes 29-33. 
194. 444 U.S. at 227. 
195. See supra text at notes 51-64. 
196. 444 U.S. at 227-28. 
197. [d. 
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2. Standard of Review 
Although Strycker's Bay merely reinforces the current trend in 
scope of review, the decision should have significant impaets for the 
standards of a court's review. The Court has not, as Justice Marshall 
feared, created a new "consideration" standard to replace the ar-
bitrary and capricious test. What the Court has done, however, is 
limit judicial review to the arbitrary and capricious standard, 
foresaking the stricter standards that had evolved. 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall expressed the fear that the Court's 
opinion limited judicial review solely to the factual question whether 
the agency had "considered" environmental consequences.19S He 
stressed the fact that an agency decision must still be set aside if it is 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA.199 Justice Marshall's con-
cerns, however, seem largely unjustified. It is unlikely that by saying 
"the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has considered 
the environmental consequences" the Court has set up a new stand-
ard of review. 
The Court's role under NEPA-policing the agency's eonsidera-
tion of environmental consequences-is not new. In Envi'ronmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 200 the court observed that, 
since NEP A forces agencies to consider the environmental conse-
quences of their actions, courts have the corresponding power to 
review the agencies' consideration of these consequences. ~iOI Rather 
than introducing a new consideration standard of review, the Court 
in Strycker's Bay is describing a natural consequence of the expand-
ed mandate afforded agencies under NEP A. 
By saying that courts must insure that agencies have considered 
the environmental consequences of their decisions, the Court is not 
setting up a new consideration standard, but merely rephrasing the 
old arbitrary and capricious standard. There is little practical dif-
ference between evaluating an agency's decision under the arbitrary 
and capricous standard and under a consideration standard. As 
defined in Overton Park, the arbitrary and capricious standard 
demands that the decision be based on a consideration of all relevant 
factors and that there has been no clear error of judgment.202 In 
Strycker's Bay, the Court does not specifically mention the second 
198. ld. at 229. 
199. ld. 
200. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). 
201. ld. at 298. 
202. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
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part of the Overton Park test-that the court must ensure that there 
has been no clear error of judgment. However, by saying that the 
court cannot interject itself within the area of discretion of an agen-
cy, the Court really implies this part of the test, for a clear error of 
judgment is not within the discretion of an agency. 
The main effect of Strycker's Bay should be on the stricter stand-
ards of review that have evolved primarily in cases where agencies' 
factual determinations were suspect.203 Although the decision leaves 
the arbitrary and capricious standard intact, it is likely that in the 
wake of Strycker's Bay, these stricter standards of review may be 
more difficult to apply. A reviewing court would have to be very 
careful to conduct its review without appearing to enter into the 
discretion of the agency or to dictate a result. 
3. The Future of Substantive Review 
Some courts have determined that Strycker's Bay limits the agen-
cies' mandate essentially to procedural matters and narrows the 
court's role accordingly.204 This, however, is not an appropriate in-
terpretation in view of the Court's reliance on Vermont Yankee. In 
Vermont Yankee, the Court stated, "NEPA does set forth signifi-
cant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agen-
cies is essentially procedural."205 The Court, however, went on to 
state: "[a]dministrative decisions should be set aside ... only for 
substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by 
statute."206 
Even courts which have interpreted Strycker's Bay broadly have 
concluded that some form of substantive review, albeit a very limited 
one, is still necessary to enforce the goals of NEP A. In Grazing 
Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt,207 the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
observed that there are two steps to a court's review of an agency 
decision under NEP A. The first step is to conduct a substantive 
review of the agency's action to determine whether it is arbitrary 
and capricious.208 This substantive review is quite narrow, however, 
and allows the court only to assure itself that environmental conse-
203. See supra text at notes 90-106. 
204. See, e.g., South Louisiana Environmental Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 
1980). But see note 212 infra. 
205. 435 U.S. at 558. 
206. [d. (citation omitted). 
207. 626 F.2d 1068 (1st Cir. 1980). 
208. [d. at 1072. 
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quences have been considered.209 The second step is to assure com-
pliance with NEPA's procedural provisions.21o The Grazing Fields 
Farm court applied this test to an EIS prepared for the construction 
of a highway through a privately owned farm and concluded that 
NEPA's procedures had not been followed. 211 The court had never-
theless conducted a limited substantive review of the agency's ac-
tion.212 
The necessity of conducting a limited substantive review to effec-
tuate the arbitrary and capricious test is supported by the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ). In considering the impact of Strycker's 
Bay, the CEQ concluded that the decision would not force reviewing 
courts to sit idly by as environmental harms were perpetrated. Rather, 
if the agency selects an alternative causing unusually significant 
environmental damage to obtain a particularly insignificant 
short-term gain, without substantial evidence in the record of 
legitimate countervailing considerations, such action may be 
modified or set aside by the reviewing court as constituting an 
abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious action within the 
meaning of the AP A and tested against the substantive goals 
and policies set forth in NEPA's § lOl(b).213 
Although it appears that courts can no longer invalidate agency deci-
sions merely because the court finds they violate the spirit of NEP A, 
it also appears that Justice Marshall's fears that an agency could pro-
claim "consideration" of environmental consequences while 





212. See also South Louisiana Environmental Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2:d 1005 (5th Cir. 
1980). There the court also indicated that review of NEP A decisions was limited to the "ar-
bitrary and capricious" standard, but implied that limited substantive review was still 
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In evaluating the impact of Strycker's Bay on substantive review, 
it should not be forgotten that the issue addressed by the Court was 
a narrow one, and the brevity of its opinion indicates the Court's 
desire to keep its decision narrow in scope. All that should be inter-
preted from the decision is the holding that courts are not allowed to 
elevate environmental concerns over other legitimate concerns. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen raises ques-
tions as to the role of the courts in environmental decision making. It 
seems that the "new era" of judicial review heralded by Judge 
Bazelon is over. The courts, however, are not left as mere "rubber 
stamps" for agency action. Although the scope of judicial review is 
no longer broader for environmental concerns than it is for other 
matters, the standard of review remains the two-pronged "arbitrary 
and capricious" test advanced by the Court in Overton Park. By re-
quiring that courts police agencies' consideration of environmental 
consequences and not altering the principle that agencies can be 
reversed for clear errors of judgment, the Court has left room for 
limited substantive review. 
Strycker's Bay should be interpreted narrowly because of the nar-
rowness of the issue addressed by the Court. The Court's per curiam 
opinion and the particular facts of the case indicate that the Court 
was more interested in restraining a wayward Circuit Court than in 
establishing new rules for environmental law. 
